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This paper offers a distinctively egalitarian defence of religious accom-
modation in contrast to the rights-based approaches of contemporary 
legal thinking. It argues that we can employ the Rawlsian idea of a fair 
framework of co-operation to model the way that accommodation claim-
ants reason with others (such as their employers) when they wish to be 
released from generally applicable rules. While participants in social 
institutions have ‘framework obligations’ to adhere to the rules those in-
stitutions involve, they also have ‘democratic obligations’ to re-consider 
and on occasion revise those rules which set back participants basic in-
terest, including individuals’ interest in manifesting their religion or 
belief. A number of objections to accommodation are considered, and it’s 
argued that the personal responsibility objection is most serious. It’s ar-
gued that responsibility can be interpreted through the notion of identifi -
cation which in turn can be conceptualised through the ideal of integrity, 
and that the value of integrity in fact counts in favour of accommoda-
tion claims. The paper also offers replies to other objections to religious 
accommodation including the problem of proliferation, the problem of 
illiberal beliefs and the rewarding the doctrinaire objection.
Keywords: Religious accommodation, fairness, framework of co-
operation, Rawls, personal responsibility, integrity.
1. Introduction
Across Europe and North America, the problem of religious accommo-
dation continues to be the subject of legal debate, political campaigns 
and seemingly intractable philosophical argument. Whether, and if so, 
when with ordinarily applicable laws and rules should accommodate 
citizens with strong religious or moral convictions raises challenging 
questions about the meaning, interpretation and justifi cation of those 
laws and rules. The problem is often conceptualised in terms of rights 
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and liberties. In a US context, this stems from the free exercise clause of 
the First Amendment. In a European context, the legal debate around 
accommodation revolves around article 9 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) which protects freedom of religion or belief. 
Both these documents conceptualise religious liberty as a right of pre-
eminent weight and authority. Over the years an enormous case law 
(and associated commentary by academic lawyers) has developed over 
the proper interpretation, application and enforcement of both Article 
9 and the First Amendment.
In what follows, however, I shall depart from this liberty- and 
rights-based perspective to defend a distinctively egalitarian defence 
of religious accommodation in a stronger sense of ‘egalitarian’ than has 
been employed in the literature so far.1 My argument for accommo-
dation not only assumes that both appropriate non-religious as well 
as religious convictions should be accommodated, or that we should 
distribute the burdens of accommodation in a fair and equitable way. 
It departs from the judicial model of accommodation where courts and 
tribunals insert their judgments into disputes between claimants, to 
conceptualise those disputes horizontally as ones between contending 
parties who deliberate over the rules that govern their interactions. In 
making this argument, I borrow from Rawls the ideal of society as a 
fair system of co-operation between free and equal citizens, though I 
suggest that that basic idea applies also to particular institution within 
society. I also give serious consideration to the objections to accommo-
dation, and I suggest that the most powerful objection to accommoda-
tion arises from the notion of personal responsibility; roughly put, the 
idea that if we are responsible for our deeply held religious and moral 
convictions then we cannot in justice claim any special accommodation 
for them. The other main claim I make in this paper is that refl ection 
on the ideal of personal responsibility in fact motivates an argument 
that counts in favour of, and not against, accommodation.
The plan of the remainder of the paper is as follows. In the rest of 
this Section 1 make a couple of preliminary comments. Section 2 sets 
out the egalitarian argument for a framework of social co-operation 
in general terms. I distinguish there between individuals’ duties to 
pursue their religious and other convictions within a fair framework 
of co-operation and their democratic duties to refl ect with their fellow 
individuals on the fairness of that framework. Section 3 explores the 
1 For example Cécile Laborde describes ‘egalitarian theories of religious 
freedom’ as those which do not see religion as uniquely special; that do not protect 
religious commitments qua their religiosity; and that accord equal civic status to all 
citizens. See Laborde (2014: 53–8) and (2017: Part I). See also Shorten (2010) for an 
egalitarian defence of exemptions based on an ideal of equal citizenship. My own 
defence of accommodation employs a notion of egalitarianism stronger than both 
Laborde’s and Shorten’s insofar as it emphasises an ideal of participants in social 
co-operation who enjoy equal status. For a critique of the idea that accommodation 
has much to do with equality, see Jones (2017).
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objections to accommodation. I distinguish there between internal ob-
jections to the very idea of accommodation and the external costs which 
any particular accommodation imposes, and outline four internal objec-
tions of which the personal responsibility objection is one. Section 4 
argues in response that personal responsibility can be conceptualised 
in terms of identifi cation, while Section 5 argues that identifi cation is 
captured by an ideal of integrity. Since integrity has impersonal moral 
value, it in fact supports accommodation. Section 6 employs the notions 
of integrity and a fair framework of co-operation to offer some replies 
to the other internal objections. Section 7 returns to the ideal of social 
co-operation to show how individuals’ interests in personal integrity as 
well as other interests can be put to work in a practical framework for 
examining accommodation claims which also takes account of external 
costs, while the fi nal Section briefl y concludes.
The topic of this paper is accommodation, not legal exemptions. 
Though the two are sometimes confl ated, the latter is a broader idea. 
For example, if a cafeteria offers kosher and halal meat then it accom-
modates the religious preferences of its Jewish and Muslim customers. 
Such an accommodation might well draw on a legal exemption. In the 
UK, for example, Jews and Muslims enjoy a specifi c exemption from 
the laws on animal welfare which normally require that animals such 
as cows and lambs are stunned before they are slaughtered.2 But most 
cases of accommodation do not involve a formal legal exemption. This 
is because most (though not all) cases of accommodation occur in em-
ployment, which is not a coincidence since the world of work imposes 
on employees rules and regulations which come into confl ict with their 
religious, and less commonly non-religious, convictions. This fact has in 
my view been under-appreciated, by political theorists, though perhaps 
not by academic lawyers (see for example Vickers 2016). This may be 
due to a relative neglect by liberal political theorists of the sphere of 
work, possibly due to the infl uence of the Rawlsian idea that individu-
als pursue their abstractly defi ned conception of the good life.
A second preliminary comment is that my interest here is in indi-
vidual, not group-based accommodation claims. Of course, an accom-
modation may be enjoyed by a number of individuals who are all part of 
a group (such as Christian Sabbatarians for example), and so too an ex-
emption, as the example of the animal slaughter exemption in the UK 
makes clear. But both those kinds of accommodation are distinct from 
when a group qua group exercises a liberty, as Bob Jones University 
did when it excluded would be black students or as the fi rm Hobby Lob-
by did when it sought an exemption from President Obama’s Afford-
able Care Act.3 Many of the moral issues in individual and group-based 
accommodation are the same; in particular, in both cases we need some 
2 The Welfare of Animals (Slaughter or Killing) Regulations 1995.
3 Bob Jones University v. United States 461 U.S. 574 [1983]; Burwell v. Hobby 
Lobby 573 U. S. [2014].
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compelling reason why one agent should enjoy a privilege not extended 
to others: this is the central puzzle of accommodation. But group cases 
involve further issues to do with the identity of the group which there 
is not the space to consider here, albeit what I say has some relevance 
to them.4
2. Fair terms of co-operation
Imagine a Christian employee approaching his manager and request-
ing a release from the Sunday work rota in order that he can attend 
church. He will need to present reasons to his manager for this special 
treatment, and if the manager turns down his request she will need to 
explain to the employee why his claim cannot be accepted. The two par-
ties discuss the matter together interpersonally, and each offers rea-
sons which s/he hopes the other will accept. If the employee’s reasons 
prevail in their deliberations, then the work rota will be revised, with 
probable knock on affects for other employees who may need to take up 
some of the slack. Thus in deliberating with her employee the manager 
is (or should be) representing their interests too. By contrast, if the 
employee accepts the manager’s arguments that release from Sunday 
working is an unjustifi able special privilege, then he will either need 
to knuckle down and work on Sunday, even though his conscience tells 
him he should be at church, or else resign his job.5
The framework for evaluating accommodation claims that I propose 
in this paper models this simple two person deliberation. It captures 
the sense in which parties to accommodation claims approach each oth-
er horizontally, in contrast to the vertical way in which court and tribu-
nal judgements are inserted into a dispute between contending parties. 
And just as it is better if accommodation disputes can be resolved ami-
cably by the parties concerned, so I think it is also better normatively to 
conceptualise the puzzle of accommodation in this horizontal, interper-
sonal way. Although accommodation disputes do involve parties who 
are superordinate over others—managers and employees, for instance, 
or teachers and schoolchildren—there is a fundamental sense in which 
contending parties are equals who must reason together. They do so in 
what, borrowing from Rawls, I shall call a framework of social co-oper-
ation (Rawls 1993: 15–22). This is the set of laws and rules which give 
individuals a particular pattern of freedoms, opportunities, duties and 
prohibitions, and which they have a general responsibility to maintain. 
The laws of a liberal polity are one example of a framework of social 
co-operation, but so too are the rules of a particular organisation such 
as a fi rm insofar as they require individuals to meet the role-related 
duties their job entails. For now, I shall describe the conception of a 
4 For an excellent analysis of group accommodation, see Shorten (2015). For a 
critique of the Supreme Court’s decision in Hobby Lobby, see Cohen (2015).
5 A third option is to revise his belief in the necessity of attending church.
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framework of co-operation in abstract and ideal terms; I shall add more 
concrete detail to the conception later, in Section 7.
The notion of a framework of social co-operation regards individuals 
as both co-authors of and subject to an institutional structure which 
regulates their interactions. A fair framework of co-operation enables 
individuals to meet their aims and realise their interests better than 
any alternative framework (or no framework at all). The framework 
of co-operation is in an idealised sense, the common possession of the 
individuals to whom it applies. Not a charter which they inherit from 
on high, it expresses their equal status as members of an institution. If 
unfair, it is likely to breed feelings of resentment and alienation among 
the losing parties. If fair, it gives individuals a motivation to meet the 
duties it entails. I emphasise the idea that the framework of social co-
operation is a regulatory ideal which is interpersonal and which struc-
tures and shapes the interactions of individuals in their particular 
roles as employees, students, club members and of course, as citizens in 
the polity. Individuals have a general obligation to do their fair share 
in keeping the framework of social co-operation in place, meeting the 
duties and accepting the limits it imposes. This includes the duty to 
adjust their aims so that they are realisable within the framework as it 
stands. Call the set of duties each individual has to help maintain the 
framework of social co-operation, her framework obligations. This is 
the aspect of the framework of social co-operation which is emphasised 
by Rawls.
However, the accumulation of laws and rules in actual societies in 
practice refl ects the customs, traditions and historical pedigree of those 
societies in a way which often unfairly serves its majority’s (or at least 
some citizens’) interests at the expense of others. Moreover, particular 
frameworks are arrived at by fl esh and blood human beings, with nor-
mal biases and prejudices and in contingent circumstances which vary 
from place to place. As a result, particular frameworks of social co-op-
eration may be unfair, in various ways. Where this is so, the individu-
als who are burdened by that unfairness benefi t do not have a frame-
work obligation to meet all the duties the framework imposes, at least 
not those which impose unfair demands. Those who benefi t from that 
unfairness also do not have the standing to demand compliance with 
those duties if, ex hypothesi, those duties impose unfair demands. In 
such circumstances, individuals need to revise their framework. This is 
something they do together in a more or less deliberative process which 
takes reasonable account of each person’s interests. They review and 
when appropriate revise those laws and rules which structure their 
pervasive interactions, whether that is in a particular institution such 
as a workplace, or through citizens’ deliberation on the law in society 
at large. I shall call this their democratic obligations.
Individuals’ democratic obligations express an ideal of mutual ac-
countability through which they stand before each other to address 
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how their framework of co-operation will fairly accommodate their 
claims. Framework and democratic obligations therefore co-exist in 
equilibrium. Framework obligations are only genuine if they maintain 
genuinely fair terms of social co-operation and democratic obligations 
underwrite that fairness. At the same time, if democratic obligations 
have been adequately discharged then it is reasonable to insist that 
individuals meet the duties of their framework obligations, whatever 
burdens are involved.
It is a misconception to assume the fairness of an ideal framework 
of social co-operation and then insist that individuals meet their frame-
work obligations within that. It is equally a mistake to assume that 
the particular, historically contingent framework actually in place in 
any society imposes framework duties on citizens, absent their mutual 
evaluation of its fairness. Adjudicatory thinking lends some support to 
these misconceptions because legal judgements take current laws as 
the baseline from which judgements are made. The appropriate base-
line from which the costs and benefi ts of any accommodation are evalu-
ated, is not that set of legal rules and norms which prevails at any one 
time because it is the fairness of that baseline which is the very thing 
in question.6 Rather, the content of the baseline needs to be informed 
by a normative account of what interests individuals possess, and their 
nature and relative strength. I shall say a little more about this as we 
proceed.
The notion of collective deliberative refl ection on the framework of 
social co-operation might seem to imply the family of views known as 
public reason in liberal political philosophy. In the case of Rawls, the 
two views fi t together since when citizens deliberate about basic jus-
tice (which for Rawls is essentially constitutive of the framework of 
social co-operation) in the political domain they must restrict them-
selves to public reasons. However, the notion of a democratic obliga-
tion is a broader one than that of public reason as it refers to the gen-
eral ideal of interpersonal deliberation by individuals of equal moral 
standing. In particular, I do not want to stipulate, as Rawls and other 
public reason theorists do, that individuals can only propose views to 
each other which are grounded in shared political values rather than 
their particular comprehensive doctrines. One reason for avoiding that 
stipulative assumption is that, as Andrew March has convincingly ar-
gued, it underplays the various ways that religion can appropriately 
fi gure in public political debate (March 2013). Another reason is that 
philosophers sympathetic to religious claims such as Christopher Eb-
erle, Paul Weithman and Kevin Vallier, have proposed an alternative 
convergence view of public reason where individuals may legitimate-
ly appeal to their own comprehensive religious doctrines (Weithman 
2002, Eberle 2002, Vallier 2014). In what follows I take no stand on 
6 Jones (2016) and Leiter (2013) both assume a status quo baseline, but Jones 
(1994) takes into account that the baseline is punctuated by cultural norms.
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the debate between convergence and the orthodox ‘consensus’ views of 
public reason. My account of deliberative refl ection on frameworks of 
co-operation also departs from the mainstream view of public reason in 
that it does not (only) apply to coercive laws, as for example Rawls as-
sumes in restricting public reasoning to reasoning about basic justice. 
As a number of authors have pointed out, this is also an over-restrictive 
assumption (see for example Bird 2013). There are cases of for exam-
ple, non-coercive establishment which can be resolved through a pub-
lic reason approach (Laborde 2013). The ideal of mutual deliberation 
on the framework of social co-operation applies as well to individuals’ 
reasoning in particular domains such as employment where the rules 
which structure their interaction are not coercively maintained.
Rawls employs his ideal of fair co-operation between free and equal 
citizens in the context of principles of justice that regulate the basic 
structure of society. Though I agree with this picture, I want to employ 
the same basic ideal to describe, in idealised terms, the interactions be-
tween members of more particular institutions in a liberal society such 
as workplaces, universities, churches and clubs and other associations. 
In all of these institutions individuals interact in a way which is (a) 
structured by rules, and (b) realises, or frustrates, the achievement of 
their individual and collective aims. The rules of particular institutions 
are not coercive in the way the law is, though they often have legal 
standing, such as an agreement between employer and employed. As 
(a) and (b) apply in other domains besides the basic structure, it seems 
reasonable to import the ideal of fair co-operation into these domains 
too. I am happy to concede that it is the coercive law which describes 
the basic structure which is of ultimate importance as far as justice is 
concerned. But accommodation, in contrast to formal exemptions, does 
not typically involve formal opt outs from the law, but rather the way 
that laws and non-legal rules are interpreted and applied. My sugges-
tion is that we conceptualise the individuals involved in accommoda-
tion dispute as co-members of the relevant institution who reason to-
gether on the rules affecting them all. I’ll return to this idea in Section 
7; but for now we turn to consider the problems of accommodation.
3. Objections to accommodation
Accommodation is a controversial ideal for a number of reasons. It is 
said to unfairly privilege religious over other comprehensive doctrines; 
reward the most rigid, doctrinaire believers over those prepared to 
moderate their aims at some personal cost; lend credibility to grossly 
illiberal views such as homophobic or racist ones; and deny the fact 
that religious believers are partially responsible for the situation in 
which they fi nd themselves, in the way that other benefi ciaries of ac-
commodation such as the disabled are not. These are all internal objec-
tions to religious accommodation in the sense that they are criticisms 
of the very idea of religious accommodation, and not objections to any 
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particular accommodation. In what follows, I shall try to say a little 
in response to all these objections, though I focus on the last which is 
in my view the most serious. We can distinguish these internal objec-
tions from what I shall call external costs. The latter are the particular 
costs, either visited on third parties by a particular accommodation or 
imposed upon a claimant if her accommodation request is not granted. 
The distinction between internal objections and external costs offers a 
useful way of thinking about accommodation because if we can fi rst re-
solve the internal objections fi rst, we can then employ the framework of 
social co-operation to assess the costs of any particular accommodation.
Let’s return to the case of the Christian Sabbatarian. As I noted, her 
employer might reasonably say to her that she should instead take a 
job where Sunday working is not required, or develop an understand-
ing of her faith where Sunday working is no longer prohibited. This is 
not just a theoretical view. The European Court of Human Rights (EC-
tHR) until recently employed its ‘specifi c situation rule’ which in effect 
said that the freedom to leave one’s employment accorded adequate 
protection to citizens of faith whose religious claims could not be ac-
commodated at work.7 Underlying that rule is a normative principle to 
the effect that individuals are responsible for their religious (and other) 
convictions. I shall call this the individual responsibility objection to 
accommodation. It has been advanced in different ways by a number 
of writers, notably Peter Jones (1994). Moreover, and no doubt partly 
explaining the specifi c situation rule, a principle of individual responsi-
bility is assumed by Article 9(2) of the ECHR which canvasses a num-
ber of considerations (in my parlance, ways of categorising external 
costs) which count against an individual’s Article 9(1) right to manifest 
her religion or belief. If we were not responsible for our religious and 
other convictions there would be no point in stipulating limits to how 
we manifest them.
The individual responsibility principle can be employed on two lev-
els. Faced with a situation in which manifesting her beliefs comes into 
confl ict with uniformly applicable rules, a person can either revise her 
beliefs or, more commonly, revise her behaviour, either by submitting 
herself to her employer’s rules at some cost to her conscience or fi nding 
an employer which does not impose the troublesome rule. This divi-
sion corresponds to two ways in which human beings are agents. As 
epistemic agents we interpret and evaluate the world we experience 
to form our moral, religious and other beliefs. Our beliefs do not come 
pre-formed and then imprint themselves upon us. As epistemic agents 
we are responsible for the formation of the beliefs we hold, however 
strongly we hold them. Holding individuals responsible as epistemic 
agents is consistent with their being socialised into the beliefs they 
regard as unshakeable convictions. The individual responsibility prin-
ciple asserts only that they could hold alternative convictions, not that 
7 For an analysis of the ECtHR’s use of this rule, see Sandberg (2011: 84–6).
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they are likely to do so or that abandoning their beliefs would not carry 
a considerable cost. Individuals are also practical agents. We pursue 
aims and projects which are shaped and orientated by our beliefs. It is 
central to our self-conception as human beings that we are active and 
not just passive in the world; we shape aspects of our shared world, 
individually and together. As with epistemic agency, this is not to deny 
the diffi culty of revising our ends, or the costliness of pursuing ends 
that do not match our underlying beliefs. It is suffi cient for practical 
agents just that we could pursue different aims than those we pres-
ently pursue.
In some circumstances, then, it clearly is possible for citizens with 
strong convictions to revise their practices, and possibly also their un-
derlying beliefs. Given the external costs that accommodation can im-
pose on third parties, it may be fairest for the state to insist on cost 
internalisation for believers and/or seek to engineer propitious circum-
stances for revision of practices or beliefs. After all, a preparedness to 
moderate one’s beliefs and/or behaviour in the light of others’ reason-
able claims is a central demand of liberalism and achieving a society 
where citizens exhibit this moderation is seen as one of its foremost 
aims. The contrary policy of accommodating laws and rules around citi-
zens’ convictions, however sincerely held, has the perverse consequence 
of rewarding the most doctrinaire believers, over those prepared to ex-
ercise their agency to revise their beliefs and/or behaviour, thus exhib-
iting a central virtue of liberalism. I shall call this the privileging the 
doctrinaire objection to religious accommodation. It questions the way 
in which accommodation appears to reward rigidity and orthodoxy over 
fl exibility and compromise.
Indeed, this point about doctrinaire believers can be taken further. 
Suppose a Christian employee worked at a hotel and had a sincerely 
belief in the sinfulness of same sex relationships. When a gay couple 
seek to book a double room at the hotel, she refuses to give them one. 
In a number of jurisdictions involving cases of this kind, courts have 
invariably found against Christian plaintiffs.8 My interest, however, 
is in the structure of the reasoning involved in these judgements. If 
discrimination against same sex couples is wrong, then why should the 
beliefs which underlie it be accorded any weight at all in resolving the 
accommodation at issue? There is a difference between adjudicating in 
favour of a gay couple on the grounds that their interest in not being 
discriminated against outweighs a hotel proprietor’s right to religious 
liberty—this accords the latter’s discriminatory behaviour some initial 
normative weight—and holding to the contrary that such beliefs should 
not fi gure even as a pro tanto claim in any adjudication.
I shall call this the prejudicial beliefs objection to accommodation. 
At fi rst blush, this objection may not seem a very signifi cant one. All 
that’s important in accommodation cases, one might argue, is that we 
8 For example Bull v. Hall and Preddy [2013] UKSC 73.
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get the right answer. If we reach the same destination by taking ac-
count of prejudicial beliefs as a particular kind of external cost, it surely 
doesn’t matter too much. I believe, however, that the prejudicial beliefs 
objection is important, albeit for the theoretical rather than practical 
reason that we should not give even pro tanto weight to illiberal beliefs 
in our reasoning about accommodation. That in turn is for two reasons. 
First, we are considering whether rules should be interpreted and ap-
plied to take account of people’s religious convictions. In contrast to the 
superfi cially similar case of hateful and offensive speech, whether that 
is visited on or perpetrated by religious believers, this is not simply a 
question of practical manifestation. It also involves the very meaning 
of the rules which structure our interactions. The question is why il-
liberal beliefs should inform the interpretation and application of those 
rules in even a pro tanto sense. Second, accommodation of the preju-
dicial seems relevantly similar to the issue of whether members of il-
liberal and harmful groups such as the Ku Klux Klan or the Mafi a have 
special obligations to each other. It seems to me tremendously counter-
intuitive to maintain that KKK members have special duties to harass 
or lynch black Americans or that Mafi osi owe it to each other to en-
gage in violent criminal activity even if those duties are over-ridden by 
more compelling moral considerations. There simply are no such duties 
even at a pro tanto level. By analogy, I am suggesting, a gay couple do 
not have even a prima facie duty to accede to the prejudicial beliefs of 
someone who harbours anti-gay animus.9
As I noted, Article 9(1) of the ECHR gives individuals a qualifi ed 
right to manifest their religion or belief. The ECtHR has stated that 
the sorts of belief appropriate for accommodation under Article 9(1) 
must represent ‘a coherent view on fundamental problems’.10 In one UK 
employment case a judge accepted that the plaintiff ’s convictions about 
the need to mitigate human-made climate change was a philosophical 
belief of the morally right sort, and indeed the judge speculated that 
in the future doctrines as pacifi sm, vegetarianism, communism or free 
market capitalism might also qualify for protected status.11 These are, 
after all, serious and important doctrines. In other recent discrimina-
tion cases in the UK, the belief that fox hunting is wrong, the spiritual-
ist belief that it is possible to contact the dead using psychic powers, 
and a belief in the BBC’s public service ethos were also accorded pro-
tected status (Gibson 2013: 581). The danger here is having no prin-
cipled basis to draw the distinction between protected and unprotected 
beliefs and of opening the fl oodgates to a wide variety of disparate be-
liefs all of which would qualify for protected status. This is the dan-
9 In saying this, I am not assuming that all Christian hoteliers who refused to 
allow same sex couples to share a room did harbour anti-gay prejudices. I am simply 
making the theoretical point that if they did, then those beliefs should not fi gure in 
our deliberation about how to resolve this kind of accommodation case.
10 X v. Germany (1981) 24 D&R 137.
11 Grainger plc v. Nicholson UKEAT/0219/09, paras 27–28.
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ger of proliferation objection to accommodation. The objection is really 
the fl ipside to an objection sometimes made of accommodation that it 
unfairly privileges religious over non-religious belief. Some theorists, 
such as Michael McConnell and Andrew Koppelman, have responded 
to that objection by seeking to show how religion is uniquely special 
and deserving of protection (McConnell 2000, Koppelman 2006). Here I 
have taken a more encompassing approach: religion is special, but not 
uniquely so. But the basic question still remains of carving out some 
category of beliefs which merit special protection
Individual responsibility, privileging the doctrinaire, prejudicial 
beliefs and the danger of proliferation are four powerful objections to 
accommodation. Individual responsibility is in my view the most pow-
erful of all as it goes to the very heart of what it is to hold a religious 
(or non-religious) beliefs, though nothing in what follows assumes that 
individual responsibility is the most important objection. At any rate, 
in the next two Sections I refl ect on this objection further in order to 
show that the notion of agency which underlies individual responsibil-
ity can in fact be used to defend accommodation.
4. From responsibility to identifi cation
A promising way to defend the individual responsibility principle is 
through the idea of identifi cation. The reason we should be sceptical 
of accommodation claims, on this view, is because we should bear the 
costs of the beliefs with which we identify. The notion of beliefs needs 
to be interpreted in the right way so that it refers to a person’s convic-
tions, commitments, projects and so on, especially those constitutive of 
her identity, and not her factual beliefs. The principle which says that 
individuals should bear the costs of these constitutive beliefs is quite 
general. For example, if a person identifi es as a Muslim and believes he 
should travel to Mecca for the Hajj, then we would normally think he 
should bear the cost of the journey. Or again, if a person strongly iden-
tifi es with being an actor but is unable to get much work in the theatre, 
we wouldn’t ordinarily think that anyone else has a duty to subsidise 
that project. The principle of bearing the costs of the beliefs with which 
one identifi es (for short, the identifi cation principle) is compatible with 
the idea that individuals can hardly imagine themselves not having 
the relevant identity-conferring beliefs. The Muslim pilgrim, if he was 
brought up as a Muslim from birth, may not be able to conceive of him-
self having any other religious beliefs, and even our none too successful 
actor may be unable to imagine herself doing anything else. However, 
the identifi cation principle is also compatible with considering one’s 
beliefs to be revisable; after all, individuals do sometimes change even 
those beliefs they consider central to their identities, for example if 
they undergo a profound religious conversion. The identifi cation prin-
ciple holds simply that we are epistemically competent agents who 
form, maintain, act on, and occasionally revise our identity-conferring 
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beliefs; such beliefs are not alien impositions, but rather they ema-
nate from ourselves (even if they refer to a transcendent world beyond 
ourselves). We do standardly regard ourselves as responsible for our 
beliefs, in the sense that we are accountable for them and can be fairly 
criticised for holding them. We can still appropriately criticise the il-
liberal beliefs of a person whose racist convictions, say, are held as un-
shakable convictions. The aim of such criticism may only be to explain 
why he should not be permitted to manifest his racist beliefs; if we can 
get him to shift his opinions in a liberal direction, that is a bonus.
The identifi cation principle does not, however, settle the question 
of what appropriate normative standard to employ in assessing how 
far individuals should bear the costs of their constitutive beliefs. We 
could for example hold that because individuals are responsible for 
their identity-conferring beliefs, they should bear one hundred per cent 
of the costs involved. That seems the most intuitively plausible judge-
ment in the case of the Muslim travelling for a Hajj, for example. But 
in other cases our intuitions are not so clear. Should a Muslim who 
wants to attend Friday prayer but cannot work Friday afternoons as a 
result, bear the full costs of his Muslim convictions, however strongly 
he identities with them, even perhaps the cost of being unable to secure 
full time employment (Jones 1994, 2016)? To begin to answer this, we 
must examine further the idea of identifi cation at work.
5. From identifi cation to integrity
I now want to suggest that the notion of identifi cation with one’s beliefs 
is best captured by the ideal of integrity, and that since integrity has 
value it grounds a prima facie argument against burden shifting, not-
withstanding the cost internalisation considerations above.
The notion of integrity has been used in different ways by different 
philosophers. A good way into the debate over the meaning of integ-
rity are the three categories of integrity set out by Cheshire Calhoun 
(1995). On what Calhoun calls the ‘clean hands’ conception of integrity, 
it consists in a person’s resistance to dirtying her hands, selling out and 
other temptations. The person with integrity on this view ‘maintains 
the purity of her own agency’ (Calhoun 1995: 235). On the ‘integrated 
self ’ conception of integrity, by contrast, the ideal consists in achiev-
ing some order and coherence between one’s various aims and convic-
tions. The person with integrity on this interpretation of the idea is 
not caught between incompatible aims; she marshals them into a uni-
fi ed whole by which she lives her life. Finally, on the ‘identity view’ of 
integrity, it consists in fi delity to those projects and principles which 
are constitutive of one’s core identity. The person with integrity, on 
this third conception of the idea, ensures that her moral principles are 
expressed in her action and behaviour. Though Calhoun has some criti-
cisms of them, all three conceptions of integrity are, in my view, cogent 
interpretations of the same general idea. Moreover, it is quite possible 
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for a person to exhibit more than one type of integrity through the same 
behaviour. For example, an artist whose over-riding aim is to be true 
to her art, where every other possible aim is subsumed by that, might 
enjoy clean hands, and identity integrity and an integrated self. The 
fact that, other things being equal, we would admire such an artist is 
a clue to the fact that on all three conceptions integrity is something 
that has independent value, not merely subjective value for the agent 
herself. At the highest level of abstraction, integrity points to the value 
of taking one’s ideals and convictions seriously, of caring about them as 
only moral agents can and ought to do. Insofar as we have an interest 
that other human beings, not just ourselves, are moral agents, integ-
rity understood this way has agent-neutral value.
I shall return to the clean hands and integrated self conceptions of 
integrity later in this Section, but I begin by focussing on the identity 
view of integrity since, as its name suggests, this is closest in mean-
ing to the notion of identifi cation sketched earlier. The identity view 
says that the agent with integrity expresses her commitments in her 
actions; the latter spring from what she most cares about, so there is 
not a disjunction between her outward behaviour and her inner convic-
tions. Individuals with identity integrity live up to their convictions, 
not only do they not sell out (a disvalue also captured by the clean 
hands view), they do not sell themselves short either; they stand up for 
what they believe in, even if there are obstacles to doing so or theirs 
is a minority view. Intuitively speaking, fi delity between one’s ideals 
and convictions and one’s behaviour expresses is valuable; it is a moral 
virtue worth striving for (at least if one’s ideals and convictions are 
reasonable, a point to which I shall return).
Something very much like identity integrity seems implicit in Ar-
ticle 9(1) of the ECHR with its distinction between belief and mani-
festations of belief, the assumption being that beliefs are imbricated 
in our behaviour, as in religious ritual for example. It is not easy to 
specify precisely why identity integrity has agent-neutral value, but 
the explanation will have something to do with the tight connection 
within our everyday thinking between motives and behaviour; we want 
to act with the right kinds of motives, this seems an important part 
of our well-being.12 Identity integrity is also extrinsically valuable in 
the sense that it is a necessary accompaniment to other values. The 
person whose thoughts and actions exhibit identity integrity enjoys a 
certain kind of autonomy, for example, since her actions and behaviour 
are under the governance of her values and ideals, not anyone else’s. 
Identity integrity is bound up with the value of self-respect; persons 
respect themselves for living up to their values and ideals, despite the 
obstacles and challenges in doing so. To be sure, this is not all that self-
12 Bou-Habib (2006) interprets integrity as the value of a person fulfi lling her 
subjective duties (even if they are not genuine duties) which he views as part of 
well-being.
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respect consist of, but it is part of self-respect, and again a value that 
identity integrity extrinsically shares.
Individuals with identity integrity value and identify with their ide-
als, convictions and principles. That is why they orient their behaviour 
by them. If they were not their ideals there would be no point bearing 
the costs which fi delity to them entails. Identifi cation is therefore a 
necessary part of integrity on the identity (and probably also the clean 
hands) view. After all, we would be sceptical of a person’s claim to iden-
tify with a principle if she abandoned it at the fi rst opportunity. In fact, 
the notion of identity integrity seems to better capture what is at stake 
for religious and other believers than identifi cation alone. Religious be-
lievers do not merely endorse their religious values and consider them 
to be constitutive of their identities; they value the fact that they en-
dorse them. Religious values are ones they prize, as evidenced in the 
challenges and burdens they are willing to meet in order to live up to 
them. Living up to one’s values involves more than simply identify-
ing with them. For example, a person might identify with the political 
value of conservatism, but not regard conservatism as something she is 
required to live up to in her personal life, nor need she even value the 
fact she is a conservative. Living up to one’s values involves actively 
seeking coherence between thought and action; one’s actions express 
one’s ideals and principles, at least much of the time, and one values 
that expressive dimension to one’s life.
Conceptualising religious commitment through the lens of integ-
rity, not just identifi cation, is important, because once we do so our in-
tuitions about cost internalisation shift. I have suggested that identity 
integrity has agent-neutral value. That is a central value at issue in 
religious accommodation cases. A policy of cost internalisation, justi-
fi ed on the grounds that religious and other believers are responsible 
for bearing the costs of their beliefs, will require them to act (or re-
frain from acting) in a way which is at variance with their ideals and 
principles, often deeply held ones. This does not settle the justice of 
accommodation in particular instances, but it does shift the burden of 
justifi cation. On the simple identifi cation view, religious believers need 
to explain why others should bear the costs of their beliefs. By contrast, 
protecting the value of identity integrity if is a powerful consideration 
which favours accommodation despite the burden shifting it may in-
volve.
This conclusion is bolstered if we consider the clean hands view of 
integrity to which the identity view is closely related. The clean hands 
view emphasises the ever-present temptation to succumb to social pres-
sures and external inducements. The person who exhibits clean hands 
integrity preserves her agentic capacity to set her own ends for her own 
reasons; she does not sell out on her ends, despite third party induce-
ments to do precisely that. She values her agency and strives to protect 
it from third party interference. Insofar as agency is agent-neutrally 
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valuable so too is clean hands integrity. After all we admire people who 
keep their hands clean; the person with dirty hands is corrupt, to some 
degree. However, in the case of religious accommodation, this claim has 
to be interpreted with care. Individuals who claim an accommodation 
are seeking to release themselves from rules which the rest of us re-
gard as legitimate; it is those rules from which they seek to keep their 
agency clean. The relevant form of agent-neutral value will therefore 
be quite a weak one. Yet to some degree, we admire individuals who do 
not succumb to social pressures in the name of their principles even if 
those social pressures stem from laws which the majority of us regard 
as reasonable.
The integrated self conception of integrity articulates the value 
of achieving some order between one’s various aims and ideals. The 
person with integrated self integrity enjoys some coherence between 
her disparate ends and pursuits, so that they are reasonably part of 
a unifi ed life; she does not struggle to meet irreconcilable demands. 
This kind of integrity is relevant too because a fair framework of social 
co-operation will enable citizens to express their religious and moral 
convictions, and at the same time be participants in full standing in the 
social and economic institutions of which they are members. Individu-
als with strong convictions do not typically want to be exempted from 
society’s common institutional life which after all meets many other of 
their interests and answers basic status needs. A person wants to be 
a committed Christian and a good employee; a dedicated Muslim and 
a keen school student, and so on. Integrated self integrity is therefore 
another interest which is relevant to the construction of a framework 
of co-operation. It too has another-regarding dimension in that it is 
benefi cial for workmates, associates, fellow students and so on if the 
religious among them are able to fulfi l their institutional roles and re-
sponsibilities alongside others.
6. Three objections reconsidered
The previous two Sections have sought to show how refl ection on per-
sonal responsibility, which began as an important objection to accom-
modation, in fact supports it, once responsibility is conceptualised 
through the notion of identifi cation and the latter explained by the 
ideal of integrity in its three dimensions. With integrity to hand, and 
also the ideal of a framework of social co-operation from Section 2, we 
are now in a position to address the other three objections to accommo-
dation that I introduced in Section 3.
One of these was the prejudicial beliefs objection which questioned 
how theoretically satisfactory it was to accord even pro tanto weight 
to an accommodation claimant’s illiberal views. In reply to this, it can 
be said that integrity only has the value it does if the commitments it 
involves are reasonable ones. This applies to all three senses of integ-
rity we have been considering. With integrated self integrity, would 
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not for example recognise any loss of a value if a person was unable to 
combine his twin commitments to be a drug dealer and an armed rob-
ber. As far as identity integrity is concerned, there is only value in liv-
ing up to one’s moral and religious convictions if those convictions are 
reasonable ones, for example compatible with others’ rights and liber-
ties. I use the term ‘reasonable’ rather than ‘valuable’ because identity 
integrity applies also to non-moral views and also to suggest a notion of 
reasonable pluralism as far as people’s moral and religious convictions 
are concerned. An individual’s commitments must be reasonable in the 
fi rst place for identity integrity to be relevant; we should not take the 
commitments which inform identity integrity at face value and then as-
sess their reasonableness by their consistency with other values. More 
accurately, we should say that the value of identity integrity implies 
that all the components of a person’s moral and religious convictions 
are reasonable. Thus in the example from Section 3, if a Christian ho-
tel employee’s belief that same sex couple’s merit lesser civic standing 
which is a valueless one to live up to; not her Christian doctrine as a 
whole.
Moreover, the ideal of interpersonal deliberation which is at the 
core of the fair framework view offers a further reply to the prejudi-
cial beliefs objection. Individuals’ democratic obligations to refl ect upon 
the rules that govern their framework involve them addressing each 
other as democratic partners who recognise each other’s standing in 
determining the rules which regulate their interactions. As such, they 
have a duty to respect each other’s co-authority in determining their 
common rules, and that duty is inconsistent with treating individuals 
with whom one is deliberating as enjoying lesser standing in all those 
practices which the framework governs. A refusal to offer a room to a 
same sex couple, conveys discriminatory message to gay and lesbian 
citizens, a stance which is inconsistent with regarding those citizens as 
participants with equal authority in a common enterprise of interper-
sonal justifi cation. The religious claimants might object that they af-
fi rm that the gay couple are equally worthy human beings; they simply 
cannot extend a service to them in cases where (so they believe) they 
would be complicit in positively appraising some practice antithetical 
to their deepest convictions. However, this reply puts too much weight 
on a standalone notion of regarding someone as an equal separate from 
how one treats them in practice. In the shared institutional realm, how 
we regard people is principally manifest in the treatment we accord 
them. We are free to avoid others’ company in the private domain and 
choose our friends and intimates there, but qua deliberation on com-
mon rules we have prima facie duties not to undermine each other’s 
basic standing.
The proliferation objection questioned the possibility of circum-
scribing a special category of religious and moral commitments which 
enjoyed protected status while others do not. The notion of identity in-
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tegrity offers a reply to this objection if we stipulate that it is a person’s 
identity-related (reasonable) convictions which are at stake in accom-
modation cases. That seems a plausible stipulation; after all, if you do 
not identify with, say, being a vegetarian then it is not very coherent 
to claim that there is some special value in living up to your vegetarian 
beliefs. Adding plausibility, the notion of identity-related commitments 
has been employed in other areas besides religious accommodation. In 
his defence of minority cultural rights, Alan Patten uses the notion 
identity-conferring commitments to motivate a principle of fair oppor-
tunity to pursue one’s cultural aims (Patten 2014: 133–136). Patten 
points out that identity-conferring commitments have a less negotiable 
character than other kinds of goals and tend to play a pivotal role in 
enabling a person to pursue her other goals. This way of thinking of-
fers a response to critics of accommodation such as Richard Arneson. 
Arneson imagines a group of surfers who wish to take psychedelic 
drugs in order to transform their weekend surfi ng into a ‘sublime and 
moving experience’ and he questions how far this is different from re-
ligious believers who ingest hallucinogens as in the Smith v. Oregon 
case (Arneson 2010).13 It does not seem very plausible to say that the 
surfer frustrated by a law which proscribes drug-taking has failed to 
live up to her commitments in the same way that Al Smith argued that 
he was prevented from practising the elements of his Native American 
faith. I concede it is possible to imagine a drug-taking surfer whose 
commitments to those twin pursuits did form an analogous kind of 
identity-related commitment to Smith. But there are inevitably grey 
areas with any philosophical criterion and the proliferation objection 
only has traction if accommodation cases are peculiarly susceptible to 
counter-intuitive cases such as this one.
The rewarding the doctrinaire objection claimed that accommoda-
tion rewards those believers who are most rigid in their convictions 
and the least prepared to revise them in the light of others’ legitimate 
claims. In a liberal society, by contrast, we should encourage individu-
als to refl ect on their beliefs, not cultivate sectarian orthodoxies. How-
ever, while the latter is correct, it is not necessarily in confl ict with 
accommodation. The assessment of accommodation claims proceeds 
from an impartial judgement on the nature and strength of relevant 
interests, identity integrity among them. Individuals have democratic 
obligations to present their views in ways that others can acknowl-
edge and to make a genuine effort to understand others’ perspectives 
as well. The strength of a genuine interest in some context may depart 
from the particular way it is presented by claimants, at least prior to 
mutual deliberation. The purpose of accommodation is to allow persons 
to live up to their reasonable identity-related commitments; this may 
be less than initially demanded by some claimants. More generally, the 
13 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith 
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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structure of interpersonal justifi cation encourages all sides to refl ect on 
their beliefs, in order to present them to others in ways they can rea-
sonably accept. In some cases at least, the message of civic inclusive-
ness that good faith deliberation involves might promote a willingness 
among the orthodox to moderate their demands on others insofar as 
more rigid demands may stem in part from feelings of disconnection 
and separation from common social, economic and political institu-
tions. It is now time to say a little more about what this deliberation 
involves in practice.
7. Resolving accommodation
I have set out above a framework for addressing claims to special ac-
commodation for citizens with strong religious or moral convictions, 
and I have tried to show how accommodation as an ideal is not suscep-
tible to some of the more common objections levelled against it. In this 
penultimate Section I outline, albeit in sketchy form, how this frame-
work can be put to use in resolving actual accommodation cases. In 
doing so, I also say something about the costs which accommodation, 
or its absence, visits on contending parties, and how these costs might 
be fairly distributed.
The basic idea is that the ideal of fair terms of co-operation, as part 
of the larger notion of interpersonal justifi cation, models how parties to 
any accommodation dispute should approach the issue at hand. Their 
deliberations are fair to the extent that they approach the ideal, and 
lacking in fairness to the extent that they depart from it. I earlier re-
ferred to individuals’ framework obligations to adjust their aims so 
they are realisable within a given set of rules and their democratic 
obligations to refl ect upon the fairness of the rules to which they are 
equally subject and to revise them where necessary. Both these sets of 
obligations assume a degree of responsibility, a person’s responsibility 
for revising her aims so that they are achievable within a given frame-
work and her responsibility to enter into good faith negotiations with 
others, respectively. Those negotiations will accord a high, but not ab-
solute, value to integrity, especially identity integrity. As we noted, the 
participants in co-operative endeavours are citizens, but they do not for 
the most part discharge their framework and democratic obligations 
qua citizens. The notion of fair terms of co-operation is a regulatory 
ideal which covers other sets of rules than a state’s laws; in particular 
it applies, or could be used to apply, to the associational domain which 
includes private fi rms as well as other employers, and educational in-
stitutions including schools and universities i.e. those domains where 
accommodation controversies occur. This claim needs to be interpreted 
with care. I am not arguing that individuals have framework and dem-
ocratic obligations in every institution in which they co-operate. They 
do not have them in institutions not governed by codifi ed rules, such 
as the family. And they need not have them in rule-bound institutions 
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where other values compete with fairness. For example, individuals 
are free to join hierarchical religious organisations the directives of 
which are justifi ed fi rst personally by religious values and third per-
sonally by the value of consent (I assume here that individuals have 
meaningful exit rights too). But the domains of work, and of education, 
are so pervasive and ubiquitous and have such a large role to play in 
realising, or frustrating, our interests that with very few exceptions 
(such as individuals who choose to join very hierarchic institutions), it 
seems reasonable to assert that they should approach the ideal of fair 
social co-operation.
To make more vivid how this ideal of accommodation could work in 
practice, let’s return to the case of the Christian employee reluctant to 
work Sundays. The question for him and his employer, and his fellow 
employees insofar as their interests are affected, is whether his claim 
to be released from Sunday working should be specially accommodated. 
The fi rst thing to say is that the baseline for assessing this should be a 
moralised one that accounts for the affected individuals’ relevant inter-
ests. This contrasts with an empirical baseline where the position from 
which we assess whether rules should be re-interpreted or subject to 
exemptions simply are the prevailing legal arrangements, in this case 
the law which says that employers may permissibly require people to 
work on Sundays. It is not the case that the burden of justifi cation falls 
on departures from that rule because the question at issue is whether 
that rule is fair in the fi rst place and that question can only be ad-
dressed by assessing the relevant interests at stake. What are these 
interests? One of them is the Christian Sabbatarian’s identity integrity 
interest in manifesting her religious convictions as well as her inte-
grated self integrity interest in being a Christian and an employee in 
good standing and her clean hands integrity interest in not selling out 
her convictions. Leaving one’s employment as a condition of maintain-
ing one’s religious convictions, if our Christian Sabbatarian looks for a 
job that does not involve Sunday working, visits upon her the cost of 
lost salary while she looks for work, possible retraining costs, as well 
as the identity, recognition, and collegial solidarity that her work gave 
her (notwithstanding that she may enjoy these in the future in another 
job). Against this, though, are the employer’s and fellow employees’ 
interests. What are those?
One of these, I think, is a general, expressive interest in having one 
rule for all, whether that is all employees in the case of a work organi-
sation or all citizens in the case of a law. Uniform rules and laws signal 
that all count equally and are members in equal standing of the same 
institution, even if some employees enjoy greater responsibilities than 
others. This sort of expressive value counts against having separate 
cafeterias for managers and workers for example, or separate toilets. 
Of course, such ‘separate but equal’ policies are often discriminatory 
and that too counts against their implementation. But beside that, 
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common rules tend also to send an inclusive message that all parties 
are situated equally which is important for the perceived fairness of 
any enterprise. We can represent this as a cost, diffused among other 
employees, if one of their number is released from a normal require-
ment, such as Sunday working in the case we’re considering.
The expressive value of one rule for all is a moralised interest, and 
there are other examples of moralised interests in accommodation claims. 
I have already mentioned the interests of gay and lesbian citizens in civ-
ic dignity which counts against, and in my view outweighs, the interests 
of Christians to be released from rules mandating their impartial treat-
ment of individuals to whom they offer a service. Another example is 
the UK case of Azmi v. Kirklees where a Muslim teaching assistant was 
refused the right to wear a niqab which covered her face at work because 
of young children’s interests in effective interaction with their teacher.14 
As the latter is connected to children’s moral interests in education and 
development it outweighed Azmi’s interest in wearing her niqab at work. 
But besides these moralised interests we must also take account of the 
ordinary costs visited on an employer and a person’s fellow employees, 
and others, if accommodation claimants have their way. Thus to accom-
modate a request not to work Sundays, other employees will probably 
have to take up the slack and re-arrange their work rota, and perhaps 
even work more days than they otherwise would. For another example, 
consider the exemptions for Sikh men in the UK and elsewhere from 
laws making wearing crash helmets and hard hats mandatory. If this 
(let us suppose) results in more head injuries for Sikhs, then this means 
more cases for medical staff to deal with and fractionally greater costs 
for taxpayers in a socialised healthcare system such as the NHS in the 
UK. These too are legitimate interests which must be counted against 
the integrity interests of male Sikh citizens.
In resolving such diffi cult cases, I am urging that contending sides 
enter into a good faith negotiation where each party acknowledges that 
she has framework obligations to pursue her aims within an existing 
set of rules but also democratic obligations to discuss and where neces-
sary revise those rules. By referring to democratic obligations I should 
be clear that I am not recommending an ideal of workplace democracy 
where all a workplace’s rules are legitimate only if they are the object 
of widespread deliberative agreement. I assume only that problematic 
rules—those that set back participants’ key interests—are collectively 
re-assessed by those subject to them, and that a mutually satisfactory 
interpersonal resolution is far preferable than recourse to courts and 
tribunals. As far as formal exemption from a state’s laws are concerned, 
such as the Sikh exemption from the law mandating the wearing of 
crash helmets, then such resolution will occur in legislatures between 
elected representatives, as indeed was the case when the UK Parlia-
ment passed this exemption in 1976.15
14 Azmi v. Kirklees Metropolitan Borough Council (2007) IRLR 434.
15 Motor-Cycle Crash Helmets (Religious Exemption) Act 1976, Section 2A.
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8. Conclusion
The personal responsibility objection to religious accommodation, I 
suggested, fl owed from our intuitions about individuals’ identifi cation 
with their beliefs. The notion of identifi cation, I argued, cuts both ways, 
pointing to how individuals should bear at least some of the costs of 
their convictions but at the same time how their interest in identity 
integrity could be set back by doing so. The notion of a fair framework 
of social co-operation offers a way of capturing the two sets of concerns 
at stake. Individuals have duties both to implement the framework de-
spite the burdens it imposes (in part because they are accountable for 
their moral and religious convictions), but also democratic duties to 
revise the framework, including re-interpreting the meaning and im-
plementation of universal rules when they set back others’ interests in 
integrity. Thus the notion of a framework of social co-operation offers 
a potentially appealing way for citizens to resolve the accommodation 
disputes which bedevil them in a way that fairly meets their relevant 
interests.
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